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An Existence Result for Hierarchical Stackelberg v/s
Stackelberg Games
Ankur A. Kulkarni and Uday V. Shanbhag
Abstract—In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of
leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium
conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting
equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of follower
equilibria and nonconvexity of leader problems whereby the problem
of providing sufficient conditions for existence of global or even local
equilibria remains largely open. Indeed available existence statements
are restrictive and model specific. In this paper, we present what is
possibly the first general existence result for equilibria for this class
of games. Importantly, we impose no single-valuedness assumption
on the equilibrium of the follower-level game. Specifically, under
the assumption that the objectives of the leaders admit a quasi-
potential function, a concept we introduce in this paper, the global
and local minimizers of a suitably defined optimization problem
are shown to be the global and local equilibria of the game. In
effect existence of equilibria can be guaranteed by the solvability
of an optimization problem, which holds under mild and verifiable
conditions. We motivate quasi-potential games through an application
in communication networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent past has seen increased interest in hierarchical sys-
tems with competing participants. The standard analysis for such
systems concentrates on the Stackelberg model [16] of a game –
a single player, called a leader, acts first while all other players,
called followers, act subsequently under the usual assumptions of
a noncooperative game. However contemporary markets, such as
those in the power industry, require the modeling and analysis of a
more complex game where multiple Stackelberg leaders compete
in a noncooperative game following which followers play a
noncooperative game amongst themselves, taking the decisions of
leaders as fixed. This situation models the clearing of a sequence
of markets, such as the day-ahead and real-time markets, where
the participants of the day-ahead market are taken as leaders and
those of the real-time markets are taken as followers.
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , N} denote the set of leaders where leader
i solves the parametrized problem:
Li(x−i) min
xi,yi
ϕi(xi, yi;x
−i) s.t. xi ∈ Xi, yi ∈ S(x),
xi ∈ R
mi and ϕi denote leader i’s action and objective while x−i
and (x¯i, x−i) are defined as x−i , (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN)
and (x¯i, x−i) , (x1, . . . , xi−1, x¯i, xi+1, . . . , xN). For each x,
the set of follower equilibria is denoted by S(x) and yi denotes the
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strategy profile of all followers. Though yi is not strictly within
leader i’s control, a minimization over yi is performed by an
optimistic leader; a pessimistic leader would maximize over yi
while minimizing over xi. These notions coincide if S is single-
valued but can be quite different when S is multi-valued. We
assume that each follower solves a convex optimization problem
parametrized by the strategies of the leaders and other followers.
It follows that S(x) is given by the solution set of a variational
inequality (VI), say VI(G(x, ·),K(x)); the solution set is denoted
SOL(G(xi, x
−i, ·),K(xi, x
−i)). We assume that the set-valued
map K is continuous and G is a continous mapping of all
variables.
The set Xi represents other constraints and is assumed to be
a convex and compact set. For each i, objective function ϕi is
defined over X × Y , where X ,
∏N
i=1Xi and Y is the ambient
space of yi for any i ∈ N . We assume ϕi to be continuous for
each i. Let y = (y1, . . . , yN ) and Ωi(x−i) be the feasible region
of Li(x−i), given by
Ωi(x
−i) , {(xi, yi) | xi ∈ Xi, yi ∈ S(x)} . (1)
Let Ω(x) denote the Cartesian product of Ωi(x−i), Ω(x) ,∏N
i=1 Ωi(x
−i) and let F be defined as
F , {(x, y) |xi ∈ Xi, yi ∈ Yi, yi ∈ S(x), i ∈ N } , (2)
which is the set of tuples (x, y) such that (xi, yi) is feasible for
Li(x−i) for all i. It is easily seen that F is the set of fixed points
of Ω, i.e. F = {(x, y) ∈ Rn : (x, y) ∈ Ω(x, y)}. We denote this
multi-leader multi-follower game by E .
In the spirit of the Stackelberg equilibrium, or subgame perfect
equilibrium, the followers’ response must be taken as the Nash
equilibrium of the follower-level game parametrized by leader
strategy profiles, whereas the leaders themselves choose decisions
their while anticipating and being constrained by the equilibrium
of the follower-level game. An equilibrium of such a multi-leader
multi-follower game or Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg game is the
Nash equilibrium of this game between leaders.
Definition 1.1 (Global Nash equilibrium): Consider the multi-
leader multi-follower game E . The global Nash equilibrium, or
simply equilibrium, of E is a point (x, y) ∈ F that satisfies the
following:
ϕi(xi, yi;x
−i) ≤ ϕi(ui, vi;x
−i), (3)
∀(ui, vi) ∈ Ωi(x
−i, y−i), and all i ∈ N .
Eq (3) says that at an equilibrium (x, y), (xi, yi) lies in the
set of best responses to (x−i, y−i) for all i. The qualification
“global” is useful in distinguishing the equilibrium from its
stationary counterparts (referred to as a “Nash B-stationary”) or
its local counterpart (referred to as a “local Nash equilibrium”).
In this paper, we mainly focus on global Nash equilibria and we
2refer to them as simply “equilibria”; other notions are qualified
accordingly.
Despite it being a reasonable and natural model, till date no
reliable theory for the existence of equilibria to multi-leader
multi-follower games is available [12]. In fact there are fairly
simple multi-leader multi-follower games which admit no equi-
libria; a particularly telling example was shown by Pang and
Fukushima [12] (we discuss this example in Section III-C). To
the best of our knowledge, existence statements are known only
for problems where the follower-level equilibrium is unique for
each strategy profile of the leaders. These results are obtained
via explicit substitution of this equilibrium and further analysis
of the leader-level equilibrium [15], [17], [5]; it is evident that
such a modus operandi can succeed only when the cost functions
and constraints associated with the players take suitable simple
forms. On another track, existence has been claimed for weaker
notions of equilibria, e.g., solutions of the aggregated stationarity
conditions of the problems of the leaders [8], [14], [11].
The analysis of such games is hindered by the inapplicability of
standard fixed point theorems – in particular the lack of convexity
of the leaders’ problems, and suitable continuity properties in
the best response functions of the leaders. In this paper we
provide a clean result for the existence of equilibria that does not
assume the uniqueness or favorable structure of the follower-level
equilibrium. The tool we use is similar to but distinct from the
potential game [10]. We relate the minimizer of an optimization
problem to the equilibrium of the game, thereby obviating the
need to apply fixed point theory. Our main contributions can be
summarized as follows:
(1) Global equilibria of quasi-potential games: We introduce
a new class of multi-leader multi-follower games, called quasi-
potential games, in which the leaders’ objectives take on a
particular structure, part of which admits a potential function.
We motivate this class of games through an application in com-
munication networks. We show that the global minimizers of a
suitably defined optimization problem are the global equilibria of
such games. Consequently, sufficiency requirements for existence
reduce to mild and verifiable conditions for the solvability of
optimization problems (such as continuity of the objective and
compactness of feasible region). Furthermore, we establish a
similar relation for the pessimistic formulation.
(2) Local and Nash-Stationary Equilibria: Notably, such rela-
tionships are shown to extend to allow for relating local minimiz-
ers and stationary points of the associated optimization problem
to local Nash equilibria and stationary equilibria.
The remainder of the paper is organized into three sections. In
Section II, we provide an example of a quasi-potential multi-leader
multi-follower game and comment on the analytical intractability
of general multi-leader multi-follower games. In Section III, we
provide our main results. The paper concludes in Section IV with
a brief summary.
II. MULTI-LEADER MULTI-FOLLOWER GAMES: EXAMPLES
AND BACKGROUND
A. Examples of multi-leader multi-follower games
In one of the first examples of multi-leader multi-follower
games [15], a set of followers compete in a Cournot game
to determine quantity of production, while each leader makes
a decision constrained by the equilibrium quantities produced
by the followers. Furthermore, leaders compete amongst each
other to decide their production levels, subject to the levels they
anticipate from the followers. Following is another example from
communication networks.
a) Congestion control in communication networks: Suppose
N = {1, . . . , N} denotes the set of users and K1, . . . ,KN
are strategy sets of users. Given a set of flow decisions x =
(x1, . . . , xN ) of users, the network manager solves a parametrized
optimization problem given by the following:
Net(x) min
y
f(y;x) s.t. y ∈ C(x),
in which y represents the network decisions (which include flow
specifications etc.), f(y;x) denotes the network manager’s objec-
tive and C(x) represents the set of feasible allocations available
to the manager for user decisions x. Each user is assumed to be
a leader with respect to the network manager (follower) and the
resulting user problem is given by the following:
Li(x−i) max
xi,y
Ui(xi)− h(y) s.t. xi ∈ Ki, y ∈ SOL(Net(x)),
where h(y) represents the congestion cost associated with the net-
work manager’s decision y and SOL(· · · ) represents the solution
of problem ‘· · · ’. We assume that every user is charged the entire
cost of congestion, an assumption that is standard in such mdoels
(cf. [1], [4]). Such a model represents a hierarchical generalization
of the competitive model considered by Bas¸ar [4], Alpcan and
Bas¸ar [1], and Yin, Shanbhag, and Mehta [18]. Notably, past
work has not modeled the network manager as a separate entity
but this extension has much relevance when considering the role
of large, and possibly strategic, independent service providers in
the context of network management. Similar models may arise in
power markets where the “cost of grid reliability” is socialized [7].
B. A comment on the intractability of multi-leader multi-follower
games
We now briefly comment on analytical difficulties that arise in
games such as E . An equilibrium of E is the Nash equilibrium
of the game where players solve problems {Li}i∈N . At the
Nash equilibrium, each player’s strategy is his “best response”
assuming the strategies of his opponents are held fixed. For
any tuple of strategies (x, y), one may define a reaction map
R : dom(Ω) → 2range(Ω) (set-valued in general) as R(x, y) :=∏N
i=1Ri(x
−i, y−i), where Ri(x−i, y−i) = SOL(Li(x−i)).
Although Ωi(·) is independent of y−i, for this section we will
write Ωi explicitly as a function of y−i with the identification
Ωi(x
−i, y−i) ≡ Ωi(x
−i). (x, y) is an equilibrium of E if and
only if (x, y) is a fixed point of R, and one could, in principle,
approach the problem through fixed point theory. However due
to the nonconvexity of problems {Li}i∈N difficulties arise when
one attempts to apply fixed point theorems to this reaction map.
Almost all fixed point theorems rely on the following categories
of assumptions:
1) (a) the mapping to which a fixed point is sought is assumed
to be a self-mapping;
2) (b) (i) the domain of the mapping and (ii) the images are
required to be of a specific shape, e.g. convex;
33) (c) the mapping is required to be continuous (if the mapping
is single-valued) or upper semicontinuous (if set-valued).
The first difficulty encountered is that R is not necessarily a self-
mapping: R maps dom(Ω) to range(Ω) and range(Ω) may not
be a subset of dom(Ω). Second, dom(Ω) is hard to characterize
and little can be said about its shape. Finally, the continuity (or
upper semicontinuity) of R is far from immediate. There are ways
of circumventing difficulties (a) and (b), some of which have been
employed in literature. If Ω(x, y) 6= ∅ for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y N ,
where Y N =
∏
i∈N Y , we get dom(Ω) = X × Y
N and R may
be taken to be a map from X ×Y N to subsets of X ×Y N . This
approach was employed by Arrow and Debreu [2]. If X×Y N is
convex, as is in our case, the difficulty (b(i)) is also circumvented.
The (upper semi-)continuity of R requires Ω to be continuous [6],
a property that rarely holds if S (the solution set of a VI) is
multivalued. As a consequence, the shape of the mapped values
((b.ii)) and the upper semicontinuity of R are the key barriers
to the success of this approach. In the case where S is single-
valued, the continuity of R follows readily (since S , the solution
set of a parametrized VI is upper-semicontinuous with respect to
the parameter). A majority of the known results for multi-leader
multi-follower games are indeed for this case.
III. QUASI-POTENTIAL MULTI-LEADER MULTI-FOLLOWER
GAMES
This section contains our main results. In Section III-A, we
define a new class of multi-leader multi-follower games, called
quasi-potential games, and provide conditions for the existence
of global equilibria for the optimistic and pessimistic formulation.
Analogous results for local and Nash stationary equilibria, for the
optimistic formulation are derived in Section III-B. Finally, in
Section III-C we conclude by commenting on how the results
apply to some well-known examples.
A. Existence results for global equilibria
To motivate quasi-potential games, let us first consider the
case where for each tuple of leader decisions, there is a unique
follower equilibrium. In this case, the leader problem Li can be
reformulated as follows:
L˜i(x−i) min
xi
ϕi(xi,S(x);x
−i) s.t. xi ∈ Xi.
Denote this game as E˜ . We may now define an implicit potential
multi-leader multi-follower game as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Implicit Potential multi-leader multi-follower games):
An implicit potential multi-leader multi-follower game is a multi-
leader multi-follower game where for each x ∈ X , |S(x)| = 1.
The ith leader solves L˜i(x−i) and there exists a function pi such
that for all i ∈ N , for all (xi, x−i) ∈ X , and for all x′i ∈ Xi,
ϕi(xi,S(x);x
−i)− ϕi(x
′
i,S(x
′
i, x
−i);x−i)
= pi(xi,S(x);x
−i)− pi(x′i,S(x
′
i, x
−i);x−i).
We thus have the following proposition; the proof is straight-
forward, hence we skip it.
Proposition 3.1: Consider an implicit potential multi-leader
multi-follower game E˜ . Then any global minimizer of Pimp is
a global Nash equilibrium of E˜ , where Pimp is the following
problem:
Pimp min
x
pi(x) s.t. x ∈ X.
In principle, the above is an existence result. However two
challenges emerge when one considers the result in practice. First,
in most cases, particularly when the second-level equilibrium
constraints arises from the equilibrium conditions of a constrained
problem, S(·) is not single-valued. Second, even if S(·) is single-
valued, ascertaining the potentiality of this implicit game is
difficult since it requires access to a closed-form expression for
S(·). Motivated by this, we now provide a different avenue that
relies on the property of quasi-potentiality.
Definition 3.2 (Quasi-potential multi-leader multi-follower games):
Consider a multi-leader multi-follower game E in which the
player objectives are denoted by {ϕ1, . . . , ϕN}. E is referred to
as a quasi-potential game if the following hold:
(i) For i ∈ N , there exist functions φ1(x), . . . , φN (x) and a
function h(x, yi) such that each player i’s objective ϕi(·)
is given as ϕi(xi, yi;x−i) ≡ φi(x) + h(x, yi).
(ii) There exists a function pi(·) such that for all i = 1, . . . , N ,
and for all x ∈ X and x′i ∈ Xi, we have φi(xi;x−i) −
φi(x
′
i; x
−i) = pi(xi;x
−i)− pi(x′i;x
−i).
The function pi + h is called the quasi-potential function.
Notice that the function h does not have a subscript ‘i’, and is
thereby the same for all leaders. Essentially a quasi-potential game
has objective functions which can be a written as a sum of an ‘x’
part and an ‘x, yi’ part, wherein the ‘x’ part admits a potential
function in the standard sense and the ‘x, yi’ part is identical for
all players. There exists a function pi as required in Definition 3.2
if and only if [10] for all x ∈ ∏Ni=1Xi
∇xipi(x) ≡ ∇xiφi(x) ∀i ∈ N . (4)
Remark III.1. A potential multi-leader multi-follower game is
one where leaders have objective functions ϕi, i ∈ N such that
there exists a function pi, called potential function, such that for
all i ∈ N , for all (xi, x−i) ∈ X, (yi, y−i) ∈ Y and for all
x′i ∈ Xi, y
′
i ∈ Yi, ϕi(xi, yi; x
−i, y−i) − ϕi(x
′
i, y
′
i;x
−i, y−i) =
pi(xi, yi; x
−i, y−i) − pi(x′i, y
′
i;x
−i, y−i). Notice that a quasi-
potential game is a potential game, but the converse is not true.

Consider the optimization problem Pquasi, defined as:
Pquasi min
x,w
pi(x) + h(x,w) s.t. (x,w) ∈ Fquasi,
where
Fquasi , {(x,w) | xi ∈ Xi, i ∈ N , w ∈ S(x)} . (5)
Our main result relates the minimizers of Pquasi to the global
equilibria of E .
Proposition 3.2: Consider a quasi-potential multi-leader multi-
follower game E . Then if (x,w) is a global minimizer of Pquasi,
then (x, y), where yi = w for all i ∈ N , is a global equilibrium
of E .
Proof: Observe that a point (xi, w) is feasible for the ith
agent’s problem Li(x−i) if and only if (x,w) ∈ Fquasi. i.e., for
each i
(xi, w) ∈ Ωi(x
−i) ⇐⇒ (x,w) ∈ Fquasi. (6)
4Now suppose, (x,w) is a solution of Pquasi. Then,
pi(x) + h(x,w) ≤ pi(x′) + h(x′, w′),∀x′ ∈ X
and ∀w′ ∈ S(x′). More specifically, taking x′ = (x′i, x−i) and
w′ ∈ S(x′i, x
−i), and using (6), it follows that
pi(xi;x−i) + h(x,w) ≤ pi(x
′
i;x−i) + h((x
′
i, x−i), w
′),
∀(x′i, w
′) ∈ Ωi(x
−i). Since E is a quasi-potential game,
pi(xi, x−i)− pi(x
′
i, x−i) = φi(xi;x−i)− φi(x
′
i, x−i).
Let y be such that yi = w for all i ∈ N . As a result
ϕi(xi, yi;x
−i) ≤ ϕi(x
′
i, w
′;x−i), ∀x′i, w
′ ∈ Ωi(x
−i), and
hence (xi, yi) is a solution Li(x−i). The result follows.
Given this relationship between the minimizers of Pquasi and
the equilibria of E , existence of equilibria is guaranteed by the
solvability of Pquasi, as formalized by the next result.
Theorem 3.3 (Existence of global equilibria of E ): Let E be a
quasi-potential multi-leader multi-follower game. Suppose Fquasi
is a nonempty set and ϕi is a continuous function for i =
1, . . . , N . If the minimizer of Pquasi exists (for example, if either
pi is a coercive function over Fquasi or if Fquasi is compact ),
then E admits an equilibrium.
Observe that Fquasi is a closed set if K,G are continuous:
the constraint w ∈ S(x) is equivalent to a nonlinear equation
F
nat(w;x) = 0, where Fnat(·;x) is the natural map [6] of
VI(G(·; x),K(x)), given by Fnat(y;x) = y − ΠK(x)(y −
G(y;x)), where ΠZ(z) is the projection of z on a set Z. By
the continuity of Fnat the zeros of Fnat form a closed set.
Consequently, if K,G are continuous (which would hold, e.g.,
when the follower objectives are continuously differentiable and
their constraints are independent of x), then ascertaining the
compactness of Fquasi amounts to only its boundedness. More
generally, Pquasi is a mathematical program with equilibrium
constraints and under coercivity of the objective or compactness
of the feasible region, a global minimizer exists [9, Ch. 1].
Consider a special case of E , denoted E ind, where the ith leader
solves the following problem wherein the objective is independent
of yi.
Lindi (x−i) min
xi,yi
ϕi(xi;x
−i) s.t. xi ∈ Xi, yi ∈ S(x).
The following corollary captures the relationship between the
global minimizers of Pquasi and the global equilibria of E ind.
Corollary 3.4: Consider game E ind in which for each i,
ϕi(xi, yi;x
−i) ≡ ϕi(xi, x
−i) and the functions {ϕi}i∈N admit a
potential function. Then this game is a quasi-potential multi-leader
multi-follower game. Further, if (x,w) is a global minimizer of
Pquasi, then (x, y) where yi = w for all i ∈ N is a global
equilibrium of E ind. If a solution exists to Pquasi, it is a global
equilibrium of E ind.
The proof of this corollary follows from noting that E ind is
trivially a quasi-potential game (in Definition 3.2, take h ≡ 0
and pi to be the given potential function of {ϕi}i∈N ).
At this juncture, it is worth differentiating the above existence
statements from more standard results presented in [15], [17]
where the follower equilibrium decisions are eliminated by lever-
aging the single-valuedness of the solution set of the follower
equilibrium problem. In these approaches, the final claim rests
on showing that the implicitly defined objective function (in the
x-space) is convex and continuous, properties that again require
further assumptions. In comparison, we do not impose any such
requirement. Finally, we believe that the class of quasi-potential
games is not an artificial construct. For instance, the congestion
control games arising in communication networks in II-A lead to
a quasi-potential multi-leader multi-follower game.
Remark III.2. One may ask the following question: if the objec-
tives of the leaders admit a potential function in the x, y space, as
in Remark III.1, then does the resulting game have an equilibrium?
The answer is no, as demonstrated by an example of Pang and
Fukushima [12]. We consider this example in Section III-C. This
poses a challenge for generalizing our results beyond the class of
quasi-potential games. 
1) Pessimistic formulation: In this formulation, the ith leader
solves the following problem:
Li(x−i) min
xi
max
yi
ϕi(xi, yi;x
−i) s.t. xi ∈ Xi, yi ∈ S(x)
Denote the resulting game by E ; an equilibrium of E is defined as
a Nash equilibrium of {Li}i∈N . We know of no existence results
for equilibria of the pessimistic formulation. Indeed, solutions
to individual leader problems Li even may not exist since each
Li is effectively a trilevel optimization problem (the problem
that defines S(·), which is nested inside the maximization over
yi, which in turn is nested inside the minimization over xi);
for such problems, strong continuity properties of inner nested
problems are as good as necessary [6] for the problem to admit
a solution. Of course, when S(·) is single-valued, the pessimistic
and optimistic formulations coincide and thereby the Theorem
3.3 applies to E . Nevertheless, if the leader objectives ϕi, i ∈ N
admit a quasi-potential function, one can obtain a relation between
the solution, it if exists, of a problem analogous to Pquasi and the
equilibirum of E . Consider the problem
Pquasi min
xi
max
w
pi(x) + h(x,w) s.t. x ∈ X, w ∈ S(x).
Theorem 3.5: Consider the game E and suppose that the ob-
jectives of the leaders admit a quasi-potential function. If (x,w)
is a solution of Pquasi then (x, y) where yi = w for all i ∈ N is
an equilibrium of E . Consequently, if Pquasi admits a solution, E
admits a solution.
Proof: Let (x,w) solve Pquasi. Therefore, clearly,
pi(x) + max
w∈S(x)
h(x,w) ≤ pi(x′) + max
w′∈S(x′)
h(x′, w′) ∀x′ ∈ X.
Let i ∈ N and x¯i ∈ Xi be arbitrary and put x′ = (x¯i;x−i) in
the inequality above to get
pi(x)+ max
w∈S(x)
h(x,w) ≤ pi(x¯i, x
−i)+ max
w′∈S(x¯i;x
−i)
h(x¯i, x
−i, w′)
∀x¯i ∈ Xi. Since E is a quasi-potential game, we get
φi(x) + max
w∈S(x)
h(x,w) ≤ φi(x¯i;x
−i)
+ max
w′∈S(x¯i;x
−i)
h(x¯i, x
−i, w′) ∀x¯i ∈ Xi.
Since this holds for each i, it follows that (x, y) where yi =
w ∀i ∈ N is an equilibrium of E .
Remark III.3. Pquasi represents an instance of a Stackelberg
equilibrium problem and its solvability has been studied in several
places, e.g., [3]. 
5B. Local and Nash stationary equilibria
While the discussion thus far provides an approach for claiming
existence of global equilibria by obtaining a global solution to
a suitable optimization problem. However, the computation of
a global minimizer of Pquasi is a difficult nonconvex problem
that falls within the category of mathematical programs with
equilibrium constraints (MPEC). However, one can often obtain
stationary points or local minimizers of such problems and in this
subsection, we relate these points to analogous local or stationarity
variants of Nash equilibria. We begin with a formal definition of
a Nash Bouligand stationary or a Nash B-stationary point.1
Definition 3.3 (Nash B-stationary point): A point (x, y) ∈ F
is a Nash B-stationary point of E if for all i ∈ N ,
∇iϕi(x, y)
⊤d ≥ 0, ∀d ∈ T ((xi, yi); Ωi(x
−i)), where T (z;K),
the tangent cone at z ∈ K ⊆ Rn, is defined as follows:
T (z;K) , {dz ∈ Rn : ∃0 < {τk} → 0, K ∋ {zk} → z
such that dz = lim
k→∞
((zk − z)/τk)}.
Proposition 3.6 (Nash B-stationary points of E ): Consider a
quasi-potential multi-leader multi-follower game E and suppose
ϕi is a continuously differentiable function over X × Y for
i = 1, . . . , N . If (x,w) is a B-stationary point of Pquasi, then
(x, y) where yi = w for all i ∈ N is a Nash B-stationary point
of E .
Proof: A stationary point (x,w) of Pquasi satisfies
∇x(pi(x) + h(x,w))
⊤dx+∇wh(x,w)
⊤dw ≥ 0, (7)
∀(dx, dw) ∈ T ((x,w);Fquasi). Fix an i ∈ N and consider an
arbitrary (dx′i, dy′i) ∈ T (xi, w; Ωi(x−i)). By the definition of the
tangent cone, there exists a sequence Ω(x−i) ∋ (ui,k, vi,k)
k
→
(xi, w) and a sequence 0 < τk
k
→ 0 such that ui,k−xi
τk
k
→ dx′i
and vi,k−w
τk
k
→ dy′i. It follows that the sequence (xi,k, yi,k),
where xi,k = (x1, . . . , ui,k, . . . , xN), and yi,k = vi,k, sat-
isfies (xi,k, yi,k) ∈ F
quasi
. Therefore, the direction (dxi, dw)
where dxi = (0, . . . , dx′i, . . . , 0) and dyi = dy′i, belongs to
T ((x,w);Fquasi). Substituting (dx, dw) = (dxi, dyi) in (7) and
using (4) gives
∇xi(φi(x) + h(x,w))
⊤dx′i +∇wh(x,w)
⊤dy′i ≥ 0.
Since, i ∈ N and (dx′i, dy′i) ∈ T (xi, w; Ωi(x−i)) were arbitrary,
(x,w) is a Nash B-stationary point of E .
We now define a local Nash equilibrium and show its relationship
to the local minimum of Pquasi.
Definition 3.4 (Local Nash equilibrium): A point (x, y) ∈ F
is a local Nash equilibrium of E if for all i ∈ N , (xi, yi) is a
local minimum of Li(x−i).
Proposition 3.7 (Local Nash equilibrium of E ): Consider a
quasi-potential multi-leader multi-follower game E and suppose
ϕi is continuously differentiable function over X × Y for
i = 1, . . . , N . If (x,w) is a local minimizer of Pquasi, then
(x, y), where y = (w, . . . , w) is a local Nash equilibrium of E .
Proof: If (x,w) is a local minimum of Pquasi, there exists a
neighborhood of (x,w), denoted by B(x,w), such that
pi(x) + h(x,w) ≤ pi(x′) + h(x′, w′), (8)
1A primal-dual characterization of B-stationarity is provided by Pang
and Fukushima [13].
for all (x′, w′) ∈ B(x,w) ∩ Fquasi. Consider an arbitrary i ∈
N and let Bi(xi, w;x−i) :=
{
(ui, vi) |(ui, x
−i, vi) ∈ B(x,w)
}
.
Then by the definition of Fquasi in (5) it follows that
(ui, vi) ∈ Ωi(x
−i) ∩ Bi(xi, w;x
−i)
⇐⇒ (ui, x
−i, vi) ∈ F
quasi ∩ B(x,w).
Thus, in (8) put x′ = (ui, x−i), w′ = vi to get
pi(x) + h(x,w) ≤ pi(ui, x
−i) + h(ui, x
−i, vi),
∀(ui, vi) ∈ Ωi(x
−i)∩Bi(xi, w;x
−i) Then employing (III.1), we
get
ϕi(x,w) ≤ ϕi(ui, x
−i, vi), ∀ (ui, vi) ∈ Ωi(x
−i)∩Bi(xi, w;x
−i).
In other words, (xi, w) is a local minimizer of Li(x−i). This
holds for each i ∈ N , whereby (x, y) where y = (w, . . . , w) is
a local Nash equilibrium.
For sake for brevity we have chosen to focus only on the Nash B-
stationary points and local Nash equilibria. Similar relationships
hold also between other notions of stationarity.
C. Revisiting the example of Pang and Fukushima [12]
In 2005, Pang and Fukushima [12] presented an example of a
simple multi-leader multi-follower game that had no equilibrium.
This game has two leaders with objectives ϕ1 and ϕ2, defined as
follows: ϕ1(x1, y1) = 12x1 + y1 and ϕ2(x2, y2) = −
1
2
x2 − y2.
This game admits a potential function in the x, y space, but the
game is not a quasi-potential game. However, several variants of
this game with a modified ϕ2 have an equilibrium, since they
turn out to be quasi-potential games. For example, in a particular
variant, the leader objectives are given as follows: ϕ1(x1, y1) =
1
2
x1 + y1 and ϕ2(x2, y2) = −
1
2
x2 + y2, and this game has
an equilibrium. We discuss the original example and the variants
next.
Example III.1. Pang and Fukushima [12] In this example,
N = {1, 2} X1 = X2 = [0, 1] and Y = R, and there is one
follower [12] which solves the optimization problem
min
y≥0
{
y(−1 + x1 + x2) + 12y
2
}
= max {0, 1− x1 − x2}
Thus the problems L1,L2 are as follows.
L1(x2) min
x1,y1
1
2
x1 + y1 s.t.
x1 ∈ [0, 1],
y1 = max {0, 1− x1 − x2} .
L2(x1) min
x2,y2
− 1
2
x2 − y2 s.t.
x2 ∈ [0, 1],
y2 = max {0, 1− x1 − x2} .
It can be easily checked that this game has no equilibrium. We
refer the reader to [12] for details.
Observe that this game admits a potential function in the (x, y)
space given readily by pi(x, y) = ϕ1(x1, y1) + ϕ2(x2, y2) =
1
2
x1+y1− 12x2−y2. However this game is not a quasi-potential
game, since, clearly, one cannot find a function h such that
h(x, y1) = y1 and h(x, y2) = −y2 to meet the requirement of
Definition 3.2. We now consider a modification of this example.
6a) Quasi-potential variants of Pang and Fukushima [12]:
Consider the following variant of the Pang and Fukushima exam-
ple: take ϕ1(x1, y1) = 12x1+h(y1), ϕ2(x2, y2) = −
1
2
x2+h(y2),
where h(·) is a continuous function. This game is a quasi-potential
game, with quasi-potential function given by pi(x) + h(y) =
1
2
x1 −
1
2
x2 + h(y). By Proposition 3.2, a global minimizer of
Pquasi is a global equilibrium of the E , where Pquasi is defined
as
Pquasi min
x,w
1
2
x1 −
1
2
x2 + h(w)
s.t.
w = max {0, 1− x1 − x2} ,
x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1].
Let us consider some special cases of h.
Take h(w) ≡ w. In this case, in L1, L2, one may substitute y1
and y2, resulting in leader problems L˜1, L˜2 in x1, x2, with objec-
tives, ϕ˜1(x1, x2) = 12x1 +max{0, 1− x1 − x2}, ϕ˜2(x1, x2) =
− 1
2
x1+max{0, 1−x1−x2}, respectively. Notice that ϕ˜1 and ϕ˜2
are convex in x1 and x2 respectively. Since the feasible regions
of both problems are convex and compact (they are unit intervals)
and the objective is convex and continuous, classical results suffice
for claiming [3] that this game has an equilibrium.
Take h(w) ≡ −w. In this case, again one may substitute
for y1, y2 in terms of x1, x2. The resulting problems L˜1 and
L˜2 are nonconvex. Notice that Pquasi is equivalent to mini-
mizing 1
2
x1 −
1
2
x2 − max{0, 1 − x1 − x2} over {(x1, x2) :
(x1, x2) ∈ [0, 1]
2}. It can be observed that the minimizer of
Pquasi is given by (x1, x2, w) = (0, 0, 1). To see why the
point (x1, x2, y1, y2) = (0, 0, 1, 1) is an equilibrium, notice that
given x2 = 0, y2 = 1, the global minimizer of L1(x2, y2) is
x1 = 0, y1 = 1. Similarly, with x1 = 0, y1 = 1, the global
minimizer of L2(x1, y1) is again given by x2 = 0, y2 = 1. 
Thus we see that quasi-potentiality is a powerful property that
allows one to leverage the unique structure of multi-leader multi-
follower games to claim existence of equilibria.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We consider multi-leader multi-follower games and examine the
question of the existence of an equilibrium. A standard approach
requires ascertaining when the reaction map admits fixed points.
However, this avenue has several hindrances, an important one
being the lack of continuity in the solution set associated with
the equilibrium constraints capturing the follower equilibrium. We
observed that these challenges can be circumvented for quasi-
potential multi-leader multi-follower games. We show that any
global minimizer of a suitably defined optimization problem is
a global equilibrium of the game and that a similar result holds
for the pessimistic formulation. Consequently, the above results
reduced a question of the existence of an equilibrium to that of
the solvability of an optimization problem, which can be claimed
under fairly standard conditions that are tractable and verifiable –
e.g., coercive objective over a nonempty feasible region – and the
existence of a global equilibrium was seen to follow. We further
showed that local minima and B-stationary points of the respective
MPECs are local Nash equilibria and Nash B-stationary points of
the corresponding multi-leader multi-follower game.
REFERENCES
[1] T. Alpcan and T. Bas¸ar. Distributed algorithms for Nash equilibria of
flow control games. Annals of Dynamic Games 7 (2003) to appear.,
7:473–498, 2005.
[2] K. Arrow and G. Debreu. Existence of an equilibrium for a
competitive economy. Econometrica, 22(3):265–290, July 1954.
[3] T. Bas¸ar and G. Olsder. Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory.
Classics in Applied Mathematics, SIAM, Philadelphia, 1999.
[4] T. Bas¸ar. Control and game-theoretic tools for communication
networks. Appl. Comput. Math., 6(2):104–125, 2007.
[5] V. DeMiguel and H. Xu. A stochastic multiple-meader Stackel-
berg model: Analysis, computation, and application. Operations
Research, 57(5):1220–1235, September 2009.
[6] F. Facchinei and J.-S. Pang. Finite-Dimensional Variational Inequal-
ities and Complementarity Problems I. Springer, New York, first
edition, February 2003.
[7] B. F. Hobbs, C. B. Metzler, and J.-S. Pang. Strategic gaming analysis
for electric power systems: An MPEC approach. IEEE Transactions
on Power Systems, 15:638–645, 2000.
[8] X. Hu and D. Ralph. Using EPECs to model bilevel games in
restructured electricity markets with locational prices. Oper. Res.,
55(5):809–827, 2007.
[9] Z.-Q. Luo, J.-S. Pang, and D. Ralph. Mathematical Programs with
Equilibrium Constraints. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1996.
[10] D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley. Potential games. Games and
Economic Behavior, 14(1):124–143, May 1996.
[11] J. V. Outrata. A note on a class of equilibrium problems with
equilibrium constraints. Kybernetika, 40(5):585–594, 2004.
[12] J.-S. Pang and M. Fukushima. Quasi-variational inequalities, gener-
alized Nash equilibria, and multi-leader-follower games. Computa-
tional Management Science, 2(1):21–56, 2005.
[13] J.-S. Pang and M. Fukushima. Complementarity constraint quali-
fications and simplified B-stationarity conditions for mathematical
programs with equilibrium constraints. Comput. Optim. Appl., 13(1-
3):111–136, 1999.
[14] U. V. Shanbhag, G. Infanger, and P. W. Glynn. A complementarity
framework for forward contracting under uncertainty. Operations
Research, 59(810–834), 2011.
[15] H. D. Sherali. A multiple leader Stackelberg model and analysis.
Operations Research, 32(2):390–404, March 1984.
[16] H. V. Stackelberg. The Theory of Market Economy. Oxford
University Press, London, 1952.
[17] C.-L. Su. Analysis on the forward market equilibrium model.
Operations Research Letters, 35(1):74–82, 2007.
[18] H. Yin, U. V. Shanbhag, and P. G. Mehta. Nash equilibrium problems
with scaled congestion costs and shared constraints. IEEE Trans.
Automat. Contr., 56(7):1702–1708, 2011.
